China AI Power Report Act

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6275 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6275

To require the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report annually on the
advanced artificial intelligence capabilities of the People's Republic
                   of China, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 21, 2025

Mr. Moylan (for himself, Mr. Vindman, and Mr. Huizenga) introduced the
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To require the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report annually on the
advanced artificial intelligence capabilities of the People's Republic
                   of China, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``China AI Power Report Act''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) export controls on artificial intelligence technologies
        and related capabilities must be dynamic and adaptive to
        effectively address the evolving national security challenges
        posed by the People's Republic of China (``China'');
            (2) such controls should be regularly updated to reflect
        rapid technological innovations, China's advancing
        capabilities, and emerging methods of diversion, circumvention,
        and avoidance, to ensure the United States maintains its
        strategic advantage and to protect the national security
        interests of the United States; and
            (3) to ensure Congress can exercise oversight and, as
        necessary, update export control authorities to enable
        necessary updates to export controls, Congress must be kept
        fully and currently informed of the current and projected
        future states of China's artificial intelligence capabilities.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POWER OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the covered agency heads,
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate a report on the advanced artificial intelligence
capabilities of China, including the efforts by China relating to
supply chains for advanced artificial intelligence systems.
    (b) Components.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall
also include the following:
            (1) An assessment of integrated circuits designed or
        optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
        inference by leading artificial intelligence chip designers in
        China, including Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and Cambricon
        Technologies, that includes--
                    (A) with respect to such integrated circuits, the--
                            (i) total processing power;
                            (ii) integer and floating point operations
                        per second at relevant precision levels;
                            (iii) memory capacity and bandwidth;
                            (iv) interconnect bandwidth;
                            (v) power efficiency;
                            (vi) transistor count and die size;
                            (vii) process node used per design;
                            (viii) energy efficiency;
                            (ix) manufacturing cost and yield
                        assumptions;
                            (x) ability of the integrated circuit to
                        effectively run artificial intelligence models
                        trained on a different chip designer's
                        integrated circuit, including measurements such
                        as model inference in tokens per second and
                        cost per token with and without a software
                        application layer that improves model
                        translation ability;
                            (xi) the capability of the most advanced
                        server configuration produced using the chip
                        designer's integrated circuits including such
                        technical specifications like floating point
                        operations per second, memory capacity and
                        bandwidth, energy efficiency, and ability to
                        function at scale; and
                            (xii) any future specification that becomes
                        relevant to the development of future
                        artificial intelligence capability; and
                    (B) with respect to such chip designers--
                            (i) the total number and types of
                        integrated circuits produced in the year
                        preceding submission of such report and the
                        projected production number for the year
                        proceeding submission of such report;
                            (ii) the foundries used in the production
                        of the integrated circuits;
                            (iii) the software ecosystem, including any
                        parallel computing platforms, programming
                        models, or development frameworks that enable
                        accelerated computing for artificial
                        intelligence training or inference;
                            (iv) the method and extent to which such
                        integrated circuits are used in other
                        countries, including in the United States; and
                            (v) the manufacturer's ability to produce a
                        software application layer required to achieve
                        an improved token per seconds and cost per
                        token rate.
            (2) An assessment of leading semiconductor fabrication
        facilities in China that produce logic integrated circuits for
        use in advanced artificial intelligence training or inference,
        including such facilities owned or operated by the
        Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, that
        includes, with respect to such facilities, the--
                    (A) total monthly production capacity per advanced
                process node with non-planar transistors or \16/14\ nm
                and below and the percentage of that monthly production
                capacity dedicated to production of logic integrated
                circuits for use in advanced artificial training or
                inference;
                    (B) yield for producing such logic integrated
                circuits for use in advanced artificial intelligence
                training or inference at each facility with an
                assessment of that yield in industry relevant terms,
                such as compared to Chinese firms, compared to non-
                Chinese firms, or how many are in current industry-
                leading datacenters;
                    (C) most advanced process node under production;
                    (D) types and volume of semiconductor manufacturing
                equipment used, the country of origin for such
                equipment, and the export control regulatory regime
                under which such equipment was procured;
                    (E) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
                Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chinese
                firms and the advancements those collaborations produce
                for the Chinese firm;
                    (F) progress Chinese firms are making at
                indigenizing export controlled technologies;
                    (G) market share Chinese firms have in China and
                internationally; and
                    (H) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor
                fabrication facilities during at least the preceding 5-
                year period;
            (3) An assessment of leading semiconductor fabrication
        facilities in China that produce memory integrated circuits
        used for advanced artificial intelligence training or
        inference, including such facilities owned or operated by
        ChangXin Memory Technologies or Yangtze Memory Technologies
        Corp., that includes--
                    (A) with respect to such circuits, the--
                            (i) most advanced generation of high-
                        bandwidth memory, including the technical
                        specifications and stack height;
                            (ii) smallest half-pitch and the per-die
                        capacity of other dynamic random access memory
                        integrated circuits; and
                            (iii) highest number of layers in three-
                        dimensional NOT-AND memory integrated circuits;
                    (B) with respect to such facilities, the--
                            (i) yield and total monthly production
                        capacity for memory integrated circuits,
                        including dynamic random access memory such as
                        high-bandwidth memory, and NOT-AND memory; and
                            (ii) types and volume of semiconductor
                        manufacturing equipment used, including the
                        country of origin of such equipment and the
                        export control regulatory regime such equipment
                        was procured under.
                    (C) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
                Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chinese
                firms and the advancements those collaborations produce
                for the Chinese firm;
                    (D) progress Chinese firms are making at
                indigenizing export controlled technologies;
                    (E) market share Chinese firms have in China and
                internationally; and
                    (F) year-over-year trends in China's advanced
                memory integrated circuit production for a minimum of
                the 5 previous years.
            (4) An assessment of leading semiconductor manufacturing
        equipment companies in China, including NAURA Technology Group,
        KINGSEMI, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., Shanghai
        Micro Electronics Equipment, and Shenzhen SiCarrier
        Technologies Co., Ltd, that includes--
                    (A) a categorical breakdown of annual unit
                production volume and technical specifications,
                including minimum feature size, throughput, and defect
                rate, of all major equipment classes installed or under
                development for wafer production in foundries in China,
                including--
                            (i) lithography tools, including
                        photolithography, nanoimprint, and electron
                        beam lithography tools;
                            (ii) etch equipment, including wet etching
                        and dry etching;
                            (iii) deposition equipment, including
                        chemical vapor deposition, physical vapor
                        deposition, and atomic layer deposition;
                            (iv) cleaning systems;
                            (v) chemical mechanical planarization
                        tools;
                            (vi) ion implantation and diffusion
                        systems;
                            (vii) wafer inspection, metrology, and
                        process control tools;
                            (viii) back-end packaging equipment,
                        including wafer dicing equipment and wire
                        bonders;
                            (ix) capabilities and advancements in
                        advanced packaging technologies;
                            (x) thermal processing equipment;
                            (xi) bonding equipment, including thermo
                        compression bonders and hybrid bonders;
                            (xii) environmental control systems;
                            (xiii) laser systems; and
                            (xiv) reticle and photomask writing and
                        inspection tools;
                    (B) the country of origin and supplier company for
                each piece of semiconductor manufacturing equipment
                used in foundries in China for advanced-node logic or
                high-bandwidth memory production by such companies;
                    (C) the foreign-sourced subcomponents integrated
                into the semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced
                by such companies, including precision motion stages,
                lasers, electrostatic chucks, optical systems, radio
                frequency generators, or extreme-purity gas handling
                systems;
                    (D) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
                Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chinese
                firms and the advancements those collaborations produce
                for the Chinese firm;
                    (E) progress Chinese firms are making at
                indigenizing export controlled technologies;
                    (F) market share Chinese firms have in China and
                internationally; and
                    (G) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor
                manufacturing equipment companies in China for a
                minimum of the 5 previous years.
            (5) An assessment of electronic design automation (EDA)
        software used in the design of integrated circuits for advanced
        artificial intelligence applications in China, including
        software developed or provided by leading Chinese EDA companies
        such as Empyrean Technology Co., Ltd. and Primarius
        Technologies Co., Ltd., that includes--
                    (A) with respect to such software tools, the--
                            (i) range of design stages supported,
                        including front-end design such as architecture
                        and register-transfer level design, logic
                        synthesis, verification, physical design,
                        place-and-route, timing closure, and final
                        signoff;
                            (ii) compatibility with advanced process
                        nodes, including sub-7 nanometer technologies,
                        gate-all-around devices, and three-dimensional
                        integration;
                            (iii) capabilities for designing artificial
                        intelligence-specific components of such
                        integrated circuits, including tensor
                        processing cores, systolic array processing
                        units, matrix multiplier units, and high-
                        bandwidth memory interfaces;
                            (iv) ability to model and optimize for
                        power, performance, and thermal constraints in
                        artificial intelligence workloads;
                            (v) scale and performance of the software
                        in handling large designs, such as chips
                        exceeding 50-100 billion transistors; and
                            (vi) integration with cloud compute
                        resources or distributed workflows for large-
                        scale artificial intelligence chip development;
                    (B) with respect to such companies, the--
                            (i) total market share within China and
                        internationally, including the share of
                        advanced-node integrated circuits designed or
                        optimized for advanced artificial intelligence
                        training or inference designs supported by each
                        company; and
                            (ii) types, volume, and origin of critical
                        technology components used in software
                        development, including intellectual property
                        cores, third-party libraries, verification
                        suites, and artificial intelligence-assisted
                        optimization algorithms;
                    (C) progress Chinese firms are making at
                indigenizing export-controlled or foreign-origin
                technologies used in EDA, including high-performance
                computing integration, advanced verification engines,
                and proprietary intellectual property cores;
                    (D) year-over-year trends for China's EDA industry
                over a minimum of the previous 5 years, including
                technology adoption, market share, and software
                capability evolution; and
                    (E) identification of technical gaps relative to
                leading global EDA providers, particularly in relation
                to artificial intelligence-focused design, advanced
                nodes, and large-scale verification.
            (6) An assessment of the advanced artificial intelligence
        models determined by the Secretary to be the most relevant to
        the national security of the United States that were developed
        by artificial intelligence laboratories or companies based in
        China, especially those laboratories and companies affiliated
        with the People's Liberation Army or any university in China,
        including the most advanced models, open-weight and closed-
        weight models, based on model size, total compute used during
        training, benchmark performance, and any other advanced
        capabilities the Secretary determines relevant, that includes,
        with respect to each such model--
                    (A) the number of model parameters;
                    (B) the total training compute used, measured in
                floating-point operations and their relevant precision
                level;
                    (C) the model performance on benchmark tasks;
                    (D) an evaluation of the extent to which the model
                exhibits advanced cyber offensive capabilities, an
                advanced understanding of biological and virological
                application domains, and the ability to substantially
                automate or accelerate artificial intelligence
                research, and a comparison of such models to the most
                advanced artificial intelligence models from United
                States developers;
                    (E) if the model is open-weight, an evaluation of
                the files provided and the security implications of
                following the developer's deployment instructions;
                    (F) a description of the algorithmic alignment
                training used;
                    (G) the type and scale of compute infrastructure
                used in training and inference, including the cluster
                configurations, the number and type of integrated
                circuits specifically designed or optimized for
                advanced artificial intelligence training or inference,
                how such integrated circuits were acquired and from
                which companies, where those clusters are located, and
                how they are being accessed;
                    (H) the manner and extent to which the model is
                used throughout society in China, including throughout
                the following industries or sectors:
                            (i) the People's Liberation Army;
                            (ii) the surveillance and intelligence
                        collection functions of the Chinese Communist
                        Party (CCP), including the genocide of Uyghur
                        Muslims and other religious and ethnic
                        minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
                        Region;
                            (iii) the Government of China;
                            (iv) business and finance;
                            (v) education;
                            (vi) healthcare;
                            (vii) critical infrastructure sectors,
                        including the power grid and transportation;
                        and
                            (viii) any other sectors that the Secretary
                        determines to be relevant, such as high-risk
                        industries where artificial intelligence
                        failure would have outsized safety or mission
                        consequences.
                    (I) whether and where such models are deployed for
                public use, including API access or mobile app
                deployment;
                    (J) the manner and extent to which such models are
                diffused in other countries, including the United
                States;
                    (K) the alignment of those models to CCP
                propaganda;
                    (L) the potential of those models to inject or
                create vulnerabilities for users or other ways they
                could be used to further CCP national security
                objectives;
                    (M) an assessment of global market share of Chinese
                models and the effect that global market share is
                enabling China to set artificial intelligence hardware
                or software standards; and
                    (N) the total number of tokens inferenced globally
                using the model, the types of hardware utilized for
                such inference and the percent breakdown between
                company of origin for such hardware, and the percentage
                of global inferenced tokens attributable to the model.
            (7) An assessment of emerging artificial intelligence
        research in China, based on indicators such as academic
        publications, patent filings, and research funding, including--
                    (A) the development of novel artificial
                intelligence algorithms and techniques, including
                advancements in reinforcement learning, natural
                language processing, or computer vision, with a focus
                on algorithms and techniques most relevant for
                developing or deploying the most advanced artificial
                intelligence systems;
                    (B) advancements in hardware designed to enhance
                artificial intelligence capabilities, including custom
                integrated circuits, quantum computing technologies, or
                neuromorphic computing systems, with a focus on
                hardware advancements most relevant for developing or
                deploying the most advanced artificial intelligence
                systems;
                    (C) the scale and focus of research efforts,
                including the number of researchers, institutions, and
                collaborations involved, and the funding levels and
                sources, with a focus on those most relevant for
                developing or deploying the most advanced frontier
                artificial intelligence systems;
                    (D) an evaluation of the potential impact of such
                research on future artificial intelligence capabilities
                relevant to national security competitiveness; and
                    (E) a description of licit or illicit methods or
                tactics such as unauthorized model distillation used by
                Chinese entities to steal non-Chinese artificial
                intelligence related intellectual property.
            (8) An assessment of the aggregate public funding and
        capital flows supporting artificial intelligence development in
        China, including--
                    (A) the sum total of China's national, provincial,
                and municipal investment in artificial intelligence;
                    (B) subsidies that are underwriting the costs of
                artificial intelligence development in areas such as
                compute, infrastructure, water, and energy;
                    (C) an assessment of foreign capital investments,
                including the total amount invested and a breakdown by
                entity, including the country of origin and the amount
                invested; and
                    (D) an assessment of the PRC-based entities that
                have received the funding, including the name of the
                entity and the amount of funding received.
            (9) The aggregate artificial intelligence computational
        capacity in China, including--
                    (A) a detailed analysis of computational capacity
                of the 5 most capable entities in China, including the
                number and types of integrated circuits and server
                systems used and their aggregate computational power;
                    (B) the countries and companies with respect to
                which China sourced their computational capacity; and
                    (C) the locations and specifications, including
                energy and computational capacity, of datacenters used
                for advanced artificial intelligence training and
                inference.
            (10) An assessment of leading humanoid robot manufacturers
        in China, including Unitree Robotics and Fourier, that
        includes--
                    (A) with respect to such manufacturers, the--
                            (i) production capacity per year; and
                            (ii) unit cost and pricing trends for such
                        robots intended for commercial deployment; and
                    (B) with respect to the humanoid robots produced by
                such manufactures--
                            (i) the number, type, and country and
                        company of origin of the semiconductor
                        components, including integrated circuits, used
                        to build, run, or train such robots;
                            (ii) the country and company of origin and
                        the technical specifications of critical
                        components used in such robots, including
                        actuators, sensors, and battery systems, and if
                        not Chinese, the progress toward
                        indigenization;
                            (iii) a description of the tasks such
                        robots can perform;
                            (iv) whether such robots are teleoperated,
                        operated through hard-coded instructions, or
                        function autonomously using artificial
                        intelligence models;
                            (v) whether inference is performed locally
                        or via remote cloud services;
                            (vi) the number of such robots deployed
                        across China, including in the military,
                        manufacturing, logistics, health care,
                        security, and personal assistance sectors;
                            (vii) the extent to which, and ways in
                        which, such robots are diffused in other
                        countries, including in the United States; and
                            (viii) an assessment of the cybersecurity
                        and other vulnerabilities of Chinese origin
                        robotic systems.
            (11) An assessment of the most advanced or widely used
        artificial intelligence-powered applications developed by
        Chinese entities or built on Chinese artificial intelligence
        models, including--
                    (A) the artificial intelligence models used to
                power these applications, including the company and
                country of origin for each model and whether the models
                are open-weight or closed-weight;
                    (B) the means of deployment and the extent to which
                such applications are used, including in the United
                States;
                    (C) the purposes, capabilities, and promoted uses
                of the applications;
                    (D) an analysis of how data collected or generated
                by the applications is used, including for artificial
                intelligence model training, surveillance, or other
                national security-relevant purposes; and
                    (E) an evaluation of the potential risks posed by
                these applications to United States national security,
                foreign policy objectives, or data privacy.
            (12) An assessment of the regulatory framework governing
        artificial intelligence development, deployment, and usage in
        China, that includes--
                    (A) the explicit restrictions on artificial
                intelligence models, including laws, regulations, and
                government policies that directly limit or control the
                development, deployment, or use of artificial
                intelligence models in China;
                    (B) an analysis of the implicit restrictions on
                artificial intelligence models, including censorship,
                data access limitations, or other indirect controls
                that may constrain artificial intelligence model
                capabilities;
                    (C) how such explicit and implicit restrictions
                impact the development, deployment, and diffusion of
                artificial intelligence models both within China and
                internationally, including the effects on innovation,
                competitiveness, and national security;
                    (D) an analysis of efforts by the CCP to acquire
                greater insight into advanced artificial intelligence
                and reduce strategic surprise, such as efforts that
                require advanced artificial intelligence developers to
                disclose information about artificial intelligence
                systems or provide models to government entities;
                    (E) an analysis of efforts in China to assess or
                mitigate national security or public safety threats
                from advanced artificial intelligence systems,
                including efforts to prevent loss of control from
                autonomous artificial intelligence systems; and
                    (F) the goals for artificial intelligence
                development explicitly and implicitly stated by the
                CCP.
            (13) An assessment of China's global artificial
        intelligence standards diplomacy efforts, including--
                    (A) mapping the fora where Chinese actors aimed to
                shape global standards;
                    (B) jurisdictions where Chinese-promoted standards,
                model laws, guidance, or procurement criteria have been
                adopted or referenced;
                    (C) the effects on procurement and vendor
                eligibility; and
                    (D) opportunities for the United States to shape
                global artificial intelligence standards and counter
                Chinese efforts.
            (14) An assessment of the degree to which entities in China
        remotely accessed artificial intelligence computational
        resources, including through cloud services, international data
        centers, or through circumvention or avoidance of United States
        export controls.
            (15) An assessment of the methods, pathways, quantities,
        and companies and countries of origin of United States-
        controlled integrated circuits specifically designed or
        optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
        inference, including graphics processing units or application-
        specific integrated circuits, that have been diverted to
        mainland China, the estimated total compute capacity enabled
        through these chip diversions, and the percent of China's total
        compute capacity enabled through these chip diversions.
            (16) An assessment of the effectiveness of United States
        export controls in restricting access by China to artificial
        intelligence-relevant technologies, including an identification
        of loopholes within United States export controls and
        recommendations for legislative and administrative action to
        strengthen export controls and enforcement that is consistent
        with United States national security and foreign policy
        objectives.
    (c) Prioritization.--In conducting the assessments required under
subsection (b), the Secretary shall prioritize the identification and
analysis of--
            (1) semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment,
        and critical components of semiconductor manufacturing
        equipment that are, or are likely to become, critical to the
        supply chains for the training or inference of the most
        advanced artificial intelligence systems; and
            (2) items that enable or could enable advanced model
        performance, are associated with systems that pose significant
        national security or strategic implications to the United
        States, or are likely to be foundational to the development of
        future advanced artificial intelligence systems, including
        those not yet deployed or publicly disclosed.
    (d) Reference Class.--Where applicable, the Secretary shall provide
context to all statistics regarding China's artificial intelligence
power in the report by presenting China's capabilities and production
numbers in comparison to relevant United States and partner country
production numbers and capabilities.
    (e) Coordination With Expert Entities.--In carrying out this
section, the Secretary may consult and coordinate with other Federal
departments and agencies, private industry or research organizations,
federally funded research and development centers, national
laboratories, academic institutions, relevant media outlets, or any
other entities with expertise in semiconductor technologies, artificial
intelligence, or national security that the Secretary determines
relevant.
    (f) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form and may contain a classified annex.
    (g) Mandatory Unclassified Elements.--In the unclassified portion
of the report required under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
include--
            (1) the number of integrated circuits specifically designed
        or optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
        inference produced by leading entities in China in the year
        preceding submission of such report;
            (2) the projected production numbers of integrated circuits
        from China specifically designed or optimized for advanced
        artificial intelligence training or inference, including
        identification of foundries responsible for such production,
        for the year proceeding submission of such report; and
            (3) the extent to which and ways artificial intelligence-
        relevant technologies in China, including integrated circuits,
        models, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and humanoid
        robots are diffused in other countries, including the United
        States.
    (h) Definitions.--In this Act:
            (1) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
        of Commerce.
            (2) Covered agency heads.--The term ``covered agency
        heads'' means the--
                    (A) Secretary of State;
                    (B) Secretary of Defense;
                    (C) Secretary of Energy;
                    (D) Director of National Intelligence;
                    (E) Director for the White House Office of Science
                and Technology Policy; and
                    (F) head of any other relevant Federal department
                or agency the Secretary determines necessary.
                                 <all>