Collaboration on Adversarial Threats and Security Risks Act

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9914 Introduced in House (IH)]

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119th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 9914

  To establish the applicability of antitrust laws to the sharing of
 artificial intelligence frontier model risks, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 23, 2026

 Mr. Latta (for himself, Mr. Whitesides, Mr. Obernolte, Mr. Lieu, Mr.
  Issa, Mr. Moran, Mr. Harrigan, Mrs. Miller-Meeks, and Mrs. Trahan)
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
                             the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

  To establish the applicability of antitrust laws to the sharing of
 artificial intelligence frontier model risks, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Collaboration on Adversarial Threats
and Security Risks Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Antitrust laws.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``antitrust laws'' has
                the meaning given that term in section 102 of the
                Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C.
                1501).
                    (B) Rule of construction.--For the purposes of this
                Act, the laws described in section 102(2) of the
                Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C.
                1501(2)) are consistent to the extent they do not
                conflict.
            (2) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial
        intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section
        238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
        for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note).
            (3) Assistance.--The term ``assistance'' includes the
        provision of software, hardware, data, personnel, and other
        resources.
            (4) Assistant attorney general.--The term ``Assistant
        Attorney General'' means the Assistant Attorney General in
        charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
            (5) Covered artificial intelligence security purpose.--The
        term ``covered artificial intelligence security purpose'' means
        the purpose of protecting against, identifying, evaluating,
        testing, analyzing, preventing, investigating, or mitigating a
        covered artificial intelligence security risk.
            (6) Covered artificial intelligence security risk.--The
        term ``covered artificial intelligence security risk'' means
        the potential for artificial intelligence, including during
        development, training, testing, evaluation, deployment, use, or
        release, to do 1 or more of the following:
                    (A) Be stolen, distilled, weaponized, trained,
                developed, or deployed by a covered nation (as defined
                in section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code)
                or an entity owned, controlled, or directed by a
                covered nation in a manner that poses a significant
                threat to the national security, including through
                covert, clandestine, undisclosed, or otherwise
                concealed development activities that attempt to evade
                detection or verification.
                    (B) Substantially facilitate the development or
                deployment of a chemical, biological, radiological,
                nuclear, or offensive cyber weapon.
                    (C) Cause a disruption to, degradation of,
                impairment of, or loss of operational control over
                critical infrastructure that is reasonably likely to
                result in a significant impact on security, national
                public health or safety, or any combination thereof.
                    (D) Substantially reduce the ability of a
                developer, deployer, owner, operator, user, evaluator,
                auditor, Federal department or agency, or other
                governmental authority to oversee, evaluate, monitor,
                control, contain, restrict access to, disable, or
                terminate such artificial intelligence, if the
                applicable person or governmental authority has
                authority or responsibility to do so, including through
                unauthorized, deceptive, evasive, or malicious activity
                involving such artificial intelligence.
                    (E) Autonomously improve, or substantially
                facilitate the autonomous improvement of the
                capabilities of artificial intelligence in a manner
                that creates a substantial risk of a consequence
                described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D).
                    (F) Be vulnerable to unauthorized access that--
                            (i) creates a substantial risk of a
                        consequence described in subparagraphs (A)
                        through (E); or
                            (ii) is for the benefit of, at the
                        direction of, or under the control of--
                                    (I) a covered nation (as defined in
                                section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United
                                States Code); or
                                    (II) an entity owned, controlled,
                                or directed by a covered nation.
            (7) Exclusive purpose.--The term ``exclusive purpose'',
        with respect to an action, means for the purpose of, with not
        more than an insubstantial part of the relevant action being
        for other purposes.
            (8) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity''
        has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the
        Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).
            (9) Unauthorized access.--The term ``unauthorized access''
        with respect to artificial intelligence--
                    (A) means unauthorized access or use of artificial
                intelligence; and
                    (B) includes--
                            (i) extraction or copying of model weights,
                        parameters, or other nonpublic model
                        information;
                            (ii) systematic querying or automated
                        extraction designed to distill, replicate, or
                        reconstruct model capabilities; and
                            (iii) compromise affecting the integrity,
                        reliability, or security of artificial
                        intelligence, including through malicious code,
                        a backdoor, manipulated data, or compromise of
                        an artificial intelligence model, training
                        dataset, or artificial intelligence component.

SEC. 3. ANTITRUST EXEMPTION.

    (a) In General.--It shall not be considered a violation of any
provision of the antitrust laws for--
            (1) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange
        information or assistance relating to a covered artificial
        intelligence security risk in good faith for the exclusive
        purpose of a covered artificial intelligence security purpose;
        or
            (2) 2 or more non-Federal entities to coordinate or enter
        into agreements for the exclusive purpose of reducing covered
        artificial intelligence security risks via delaying or
        otherwise limiting the release, deployment, use, development,
        training, testing, or evaluation of artificial intelligence,
        provided that the non-Federal entities submit to the Assistant
        Attorney General, before undertaking the proposed coordinated
        delay or limitation, written notice detailing the specific
        covered artificial intelligence security risk and the scope of
        the proposed restriction.
    (b) Limitation.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to a non-Federal
entity receiving information or assistance unless the non-Federal
entity uses such information or assistance for a covered artificial
intelligence security purpose and has implemented reasonable internal
controls to limit the extent to which such information or assistance
can be used for other purposes.
    (c) Affirmative Defense.--In any action or proceeding brought under
the antitrust laws, the exemption provided under subsection (a) shall
constitute an affirmative defense, and any non-Federal entity claiming
the exemption shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the entity's actions were taken in good faith and for
the exclusive purpose described in subsection (a).
    (d) Rule of Construction.--
            (1) In general.--Subsection (a)(1) shall not be construed
        to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between
        competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a market,
        boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost information.
            (2) Private right of action.--Nothing in this Act shall be
        construed as limiting any private right of action with respect
        to any violation of the antitrust laws that is not exempt under
        this section.
    (e) Exemption From Disclosure.--Any information submitted to the
Assistant Attorney General pursuant to subsection (a)(2), including any
written notice submitted under that subsection and any information
derived from such submission that would reveal the substance of such
submission, shall be--
            (1) used solely for the purpose of section 4;
            (2) deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from
        disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code;
        and
            (3) withheld, without discretion, from the public under
        section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 4. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

    (a) In General.--The Attorney General may seek, in a court of
competent jurisdiction, an injunction against the non-Federal entities
described in section 3 to prohibit an action that violates the
antitrust laws.
    (b) No Immunity or Exemption.--In any action described in
subsection (a), this Act shall not be construed to create any immunity
or exemption from injunctive relief if--
            (1) the non-Federal entities do not satisfy the burden of
        proof under section 3(c); or
            (2) the Attorney General demonstrates that, notwithstanding
        the covered artificial intelligence security purpose, the
        actions are reasonably likely to result in an overall increase
        in covered artificial intelligence security risks.
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