Abolish Super PACs Act

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4602 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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119th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4602

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable
     limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent
                 expenditures, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 20, 2026

  Mr. Sanders introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
         referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable
     limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent
                 expenditures, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Abolish Super PACs Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds as follows:
            (1) Contribution limits to political action committees
        (PACs), including those that make independent expenditures,
        help secure elections by limiting both the risk of corruption
        and the risk that significant contributions will create the
        appearance of corruption.
            (2) Since contribution limits on super PACs were lifted in
        2010, the number, influence, and wealth of super PACs have
        exploded. Obtaining millions or billions of dollars in
        contributions to super PACs is now critical to the success of
        Federal candidates' campaigns.
            (3) As the influence of super PACs grows, so does the
        likelihood that they will serve as a conduit for corrupt
        agreements between contributor and candidate, whose
        communications are not subject to coordination limitations.
            (4) Between 2008 and 2020, the amount of independent
        expenditures increased more than 700 percent, and in 2024, more
        than $4.48 billion in independent expenditures were spent on
        United States elections. The money for these expenditures
        largely came from contributions to 2,459 registered super PACs.
            (5) In 2012, the first modern elections for Federal office
        held without contribution limits to super PACs, the top 1
        percent of all individual super PAC contributors contributed
        76.76 percent of all individual super PAC contributions, and
        that percentage rose to 96.94 percent in 2024. Recent elections
        have been influenced by individual contributors who gave more
        than $100 million to super PACs.
            (6) As bribery laws have long recognized, unlawful quid pro
        quo exchanges can occur where the bribe is funneled into a
        third party, such as a super PAC. See, e.g., section 201 of
        title 18, United States Code; U.S. v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp.
        606, 621-23 (D. N.J. 2018). Law enforcement in several States
        have prosecuted cases that involve bribes directed to super
        PACs. However, bribery is notoriously difficult to prosecute,
        and these laws do not adequately protect American voters from
        corruption.
            (7) Without reasonable limitations on contributions, super
        PACs create an appearance of corruption. A bipartisan majority
        of Americans believe that large super PAC contributions are
        made in exchange for political favors, and that corruption is
        pervasive in the Federal Government. This is, as the Supreme
        Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, ``disastrous'' to
        ``confidence in the system of representative government'' 424
        U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
            (8) Placing limits on super PAC contributions will also
        lessen the risk of foreign interference in United States
        elections, making it more difficult for foreign entities to
        funnel contributions to super PACs via third-party
        contributors.
            (9) SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
        the appellate court case that voided existing contribution
        limits to super PACs, wrongly treated contributions as
        expenditures and wrongly assumed that because uncoordinated
        independent expenditures cannot give rise to quid pro quo
        corruption, that contributions to independent expenditure
        committees similarly cannot give rise to corruption. But they
        can and do.
            (10) In the 14 years since SpeechNow unleashed billions of
        dollars in unregulated contributions, super PACs have obtained
        unprecedented wealth and value to candidate campaigns and can
        facilitate vast, nearly untraceable corrupt transactions.
            (11) Because Super PACs have become uniquely important to
        candidate campaigns and can accept millions and even hundreds
        of millions of dollars from single entities, candidates and
        contributors have reason and opportunity to guide corrupt
        contributions into super PACs, establishing a significant risk
        of corruption and creating an appearance of corruption that
        undermines the public's faith in their representatives and our
        political system.
            (12) Reasonable limits on contributions to super PACs are
        lawful and necessary to protect American democracy and American
        voters.
    (b) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this Act--
            (1) to limit the risk of corrupt agreements between
        candidates and contributors by placing reasonable limits on
        contributions to political action committees that make
        independent expenditures;
            (2) to limit the appearance of corruption created by
        uncapped contributions to political action committees that make
        independent expenditures; and
            (3) to restore the public's faith in our elections.

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE
              COMMITTEES.

    (a) Limitations.--Section 315(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C)) is amended by striking
``to any other political committee'' and inserting ``to an independent
expenditure committee or any other political committee''.
    (b) Definition.--Section 301 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 30101) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(27) Independent expenditure committee.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The term `independent
                expenditure committee' means a political committee
                which--
                            ``(i) makes independent expenditures
                        aggregating $5,000 or more during a calendar
                        year; or
                            ``(ii) makes contributions to other
                        independent expenditure committees aggregating
                        $5,000 or more during a calendar year.
                    ``(B) Treatment of separate accounts.--The term
                `independent expenditure committee' includes an account
                of a political committee which is established for the
                purpose of making independent expenditures or
                contributions to other committees making independent
                expenditures.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall
apply with respect to contributions and independent expenditures made
during the first calendar year which begins after the date of the
enactment of this Act and each succeeding calendar year.
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